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KESSEL RUN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE AIR FORCE’S INTERNAL 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION 
ABSTRACT 
 The current method of acquiring custom, innovative software through traditional 
contracting methods is an outdated practice. These traditional methods are 
time-consuming, and could be improved with the Air Force’s Kessel Run, an internal 
software development organization. With the Air Force’s Kessel Run, the time from 
software inception to operation can go from years to days. Unfortunately, neither most of 
the Air Force nor the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD) has yet to catch up to the 
forward thinking of those involved in the creation of Kessel Run. Most of the Air Force 
and the DoD are still outsourcing for most of their innovative acquisitions, whether it be 
research and design or product (software) development. This case study offers insight to 
the new organization and identifies the potential to apply the concepts learned during its 
creation to benefit other DoD organizations when considering insourcing as opposed to 
the traditional outsourcing acquisition approach. 
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This case study explores Kessel Run and seeks to provide an understanding of its 
insourcing approach and how that approach benefits its customers, when compared with 
the traditional outsourcing acquisition approach. 
A. BACKGROUND 
According to the Defense Science Board, “some of the costliest failures in military 
procurement have been blamed on software. Pentagon officials over the years have been 
grilled on Capitol Hill on this issue, but billions of dollars continue to be spent on software 
projects that are way over budget and behind schedule” (Erwin, 2018). With these 
traditional methods, it may take years for a software product to travel through the 
procurement process from requirement inception to software deployment in the operational 
Air Force. According to Mark Wallace (2008), “standard DoD procedure requires systems 
like the AOC software to be competitively bid, and for the winning contractor to design, 
build, certify, and test the entire system before delivering it to users—and then to go 
through the entire process again each time any appreciable amount of code needed to be 
changed.” The Air Force is countering the ineffectiveness of the traditional acquisition 
methods for custom, innovative software products with recently developed insourcing 
approaches. The Air Force’s Kessel Run, an internal software development organization, 
has substantially decreased the amount of time it takes to field software—from years to 
weeks. Unfortunately, neither the rest of the Air Force nor the Department of Defense 
(DoD) has yet to adopt the forward-thinking initiatives involved in the creation of Kessel 
Run. The rest of the Air Force and the DoD are still outsourcing most of their innovative 
acquisitions, whether it be research and design or product (software) development 
(Kelman, 2019a). 
The DoD has outsourced various functions throughout the decades, and the DoD is 
responsible for 64.77% of the federal government’s fiscal year (FY) 2018 obligations, at 
$358.3 billion (WatchBlog, 2019). The DoD outsources services and products, with the 
following categories receiving the highest dollar amount in obligations: 
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• Aircraft, fixed wing 
• Professional engineering/technical 
• Combat ships and landing vessels 
• General healthcare 
• Guided missiles (WatchBlog, 2019). 
Typically, contractors are described as private firms that provide contracted goods and 
services to the government (Congressional Research Service, 2017). In 2015, the top five 
defense contractors were Lockheed Martin Corporation, Boeing, Raytheon, General 
Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman, and these firms continue to be the top five U.S. 
defense contractors based on contract funds awarded in FY2018 (Congressional Research 
Service, 2017; Forecast International’s Aerospace Portal, n.d.). According to the 
Congressional Research Service (2017), the top five defense contractors “dominate 
contracts for both products and services, largely because they also service the products they 
provide to DoD” (p. 1). Regarding services, the Congressional Research Service reports 
that DoD contractors can range from healthcare providers to researchers to management 
support providers. Additionally, over 70% of contractors provide commodities; these 
contractors “include the smallest companies by contracted dollars, which tend to provide 
specific manufactured goods” (p. 1). Furthermore, contractors can also be defined as 
individuals hired by the DoD through private companies to perform specific tasks, not to 
be confused with DoD civilians who are on the government payroll. In this context, DoD 
contractors perform many organizational functions, “from intelligence analysis or software 
development to landscaping or food service” (Congressional Research Service, 2017). 
As the Defense Science Board stated, “software has become one of the most 
important components of our nation’s weapons systems, and it continues to grow in 
importance” (Erwin, 2018, para. 2). According to Jones (2002), contractors are responsible 
for the bulk of U.S. defense software development. Furthermore,  
the broad definition of defense software includes a number of subclasses 
such as software associated with weapons systems; with command, control, 
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and communication systems (usually shortened to C3 or C cubed); with 
logistical applications; and also with software virtually identical to civilian 
counterparts such as payroll applications, benefits tracking applications, and 
the like. (Jones, 2002, p. 26) 
The F/A-22 aircraft received substantial criticism because of delays, largely due to 
“the difficulty of making the complex software dependable” (National Research Council, 
2007, p. 18). Furthermore, the Air Force canceled a software program, Expeditionary 
Combat Support System (ECSS), in 2012 (Kanaracus, 2012). After having obligated $1.03 
billion since 2005, the government decided that ECSS would too expensive to complete 
and anticipated costs of an additional $1.1 billion would outweigh the benefits (Kanaracus, 
2012). Frustrations like these may have motivated the Air Force to reconsider its software 
development acquisition practices. 
The make-or-buy decision is a business decision applicable to both the government 
and the private sector. Because the DoD’s operation and support costs have not 
commensurately declined with the ongoing personnel reduction since the Cold War, the 
DoD has resorted to outsourcing or buying functions that are not considered core 
competencies (Grasso, 2005). According to Grasso’s Defense Outsourcing: The OMB 
Circular A-76 Policy report (2005), “combined with a national mood reflecting a growing 
change in the public’s perception of the role of government, a shrinking defense 
procurement budget, increased private sector lobbying for government contracts, the notion 
of contracting out, or outsourcing, of federal procurement activities has taken center stage” 
(p. 1). Furthermore, Grasso’s Defense Outsourcing: The OMB Circular A-76 Policy report 
strongly encourages the use of cost comparisons whenever possible to determine the most 
economical way of acquiring goods or services in question. 
Software development traditionally occurs through legally binding instruments 
governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Air Force Installation Contracting 
Center guidance, and other regulatory bodies (Air Force Installation Contracting Center, 
n.d.; Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2019). Three common methods of traditionally 
procured custom software exist: the procurement of custom software as a commodity using 
typical contracting approaches, the procurement of software as a service (SaaS) using 
typical contracting approaches, and the procurement of custom software utilizing Other 
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Transaction Authorities (OTAs; “Other Transaction Authority,” 2016). While all three 
methods rely heavily on industry efforts, the former two options are subject to the FAR as 
opposed to OTAs (“Other Transaction Authority,” 2016). Procuring as a commodity or 
service is more conventional in the government, and it is typically how the government 
contracts with traditional defense contractors. OTAs provide an alternate route to attract 
additional contractors by means of establishing unconventional agreements. Furthermore, 
differences between commodity and services exist as well, offering flexibility to the Air 
Force. Commodity and services provide different benefits depending on the requirement; 
however, SaaS has become a more attractive software solution model in the private sector 
(Ma, 2007). According to Ma (2007), “in many cases, the SaaS may prove cheaper than 
owning and maintaining an in-house IT [Information Technology] system. Users expect to 
save money on support and upgrade costs, IT infrastructure, IT personnel, and 
implementation” (sec. “Introduction”). Kessel Run has altered the software development 
process and enables the Air Force to self-develop software. Kessel Run has significantly 
reduced software development lead time by providing agile software development. We 
explore Kessel Run’s overall effectiveness by identifying the agency’s contributing 
capabilities and limitations. 
Agile software development is a term that has been referenced for over a decade, 
and concerted efforts have been made to achieve agile software development as early as 
the mid-1990s (Highsmith, 2002). According to Highsmith (2002), “A growing number of 
software projects operate in the equivalent of a battle zone—they are extreme projects. This 
is where agile approaches shine” (p. 4). Although these extreme projects follow a relatively 
clear mission, conventional plan-driven methods are not sufficient for these complex, 
volatile requirements that often follow erratic changes (Highsmith, 2002). Software 
development can fall into one of two processes: empirical or defined (Highsmith, 2002). 
Agile software development is an empirical process that necessitates adapting to changing 
conditions (Highsmith, 2002). A defined process “involves a relatively high degree of 
predictability and algorithm precision” (Highsmith, 2002, p. 4). According to Washington 
Technology, “the Air Force’s chief technology officer wants to make sure all of its tech 
deals mimic its agile software development model Kessel Run” (Williams, 2018, para. 1). 
5 
Now that the Air Force is focusing on agile software development, Kessel Run has received 
considerable leadership support to develop defense software within weeks instead of years 
(Williams, 2018). However, this is not an easy transition because insourcing required the 
Air Force to revamp training for active duty members and defense civilians in coding and 
cyber defense core competencies that are unfamiliar to the current workforce (Williams, 
2018). Investigating the initiation of Kessel Run will help us understand how the Air Force 
planned to close the training gap and its impact to agile software development through 
Kessel Run. 
B. MOTIVATION 
DoD acquisitions have faced increased scrutiny for crippling acquisition schedule 
delays, massive cost overruns, and acceptance of poor end products (Wheeler, 2014). The 
Air Force’s reliance on complex technology interfaces across air, space, and cyberspace 
make it particularly vulnerable to criticism in these areas, as can be evidenced by F-22, 
F-35, B-2, and KC-46 procurement challenges (Davenport, 2019). The Air Force has 
traditionally relied on outsourcing software development needs, but it has taken a new 
direction with Kessel Run. As contracting professionals in the Air Force, we have taken an 
interest in this alternate means of software development that eliminates the need to rely on 
industry to provide defense software.  
Previous methods of software development have largely been performed by 
industry for the government; however, it is interesting that the Air Force decided to create 
an internal software development organization because it contradicts the traditional method 
of procurement by contracting. The purpose of this study is to understand how and why 
Kessel Run came into being to create a document to educate readers on the program. This 
study accomplishes the following objectives in our research: 
• Provides an in-depth summary of the development of Kessel Run 
• Identifies obstacles encountered in the development of Kessel Run 
• Identifies Kessel Run’s organizational purpose 
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• Discusses benefits gained and anticipated from Kessel Run 
• Evaluates how and whether Kessel Run is meeting its intended purpose 
• Describes struggles associated with software development through Kessel 
Run 
• Documents the rationale of Air Force leaders to insource software 
development via Kessel Run 
This study documents and assesses the case of Kessel Run and provides a potential 
framework for future military insourcing opportunities. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study explores why and how Kessel Run was developed in order to understand 
this Air Force initiative to internally develop (insource) software in lieu of the traditional 
method of procurement by contracting (outsource). While there are obvious differences 
between the two software development methods, the Air Force’s motivation for launching 
and investing in Kessel Run remains unclear. Furthermore, this research seeks to 
understand the potential savings associated with the organization that stimulated the Air 
Force to insource software development by answering the following research question: 
How and why did Kessel Run come into being? 
D. RESEARCH METHODS AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This case study research draws on three forms of data: 1) information provided 
directly by the Kessel Run staff and leadership, including information posted on official 
Air Force websites; 2) information collected from interviews from Kessel Run members; 
and 3) information posted publicly by those outside of the organization. The use of inside 
and outside perspectives allows comparison between the sources enhancing the rigor of the 
approach. 
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 Summary of Findings 
The summary of findings reviews why and how Kessel Run was created to educate 
readers on this innovative Air Force organization. Additionally, other Air Force and DoD 
leaders may find the case study applicable to future decisions on insourcing other 
operations. We draw key concepts from the case, including discovering Kessel Run’s 
successes and limitations. If more capabilities are insourced, this information could serve 
as a baseline for military leaders as they make innovative and educated decisions from the 
research conducted on Kessel Run to lower costs, improve efficiency, increase compliance, 
and save taxpayer dollars. 
 Limitations 
The case study research examines one specific Air Force agency in depth and may 
have characteristics that translate to insourcing opportunities outside of Air Force software 
development; however, limitations must be acknowledged that may necessitate further 
research. Qualitative research was conducted by interviewing Kessel Run members. The 
team made a diligent effort to conduct interviews systematically and without bias; however, 
the interview subjects are all members of Kessel Run and are therefore likely to share 
similar perspectives on the organization. Further research should include other 
stakeholders, such as contractors involved with the training program and customers and 
users receiving Kessel Run support. 
Our research is limited to the information from the inception of Kessel Run to the 
present. More analysis could be conducted on Kessel Run, which is a relatively young 
agency. There is potentially more to be learned about Kessel Run in the future, and the 
organization may warrant additional study as new developments occur. Additionally, our 
research is based on a limited number of interviews focused on a single case. Further 
research involving additional interview participants and comparable cases from other 
services or industry could provide findings with broader relevance. 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The case study consists of six chapters. This research provides an analysis that can 
assist military leaders with converting contracted opportunities into insourcing operations. 
Chapter II provides a comprehensive summary of extent literature, explaining the make-
or-buy decision, including the relevance of transaction costs, core competencies, 
competitive advantage, and applicable policy. Chapter III introduces the case study method 
and details the three forms of data collected in the research, along with method 
trustworthiness and limitations. Chapter IV provides a brief organizational history of 
Kessel Run. Chapter V reveals the analysis of the data collected and findings that resulted 
from the three forms of data. Finally, Chapter VI includes a summary of findings, 
implications, and recommendations for future research as a culmination of the first five 
chapters of the research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter focuses on literature related to the make-or-buy analysis. The first 
section introduces the make or buy decision. The second section explores transaction costs. 
The third section discusses core competencies. The fourth section examines competitive 
advantages while the final section explores government policy. 
A. MAKE OR BUY 
The decision to make or buy supplies or services within a firm can be complex and 
may lead to conflict, but it is one of the most important decisions to make as it drives other 
decisions and processes (Henriksen, Rolstadås, & O’Sullivan, 2012). Practically speaking, 
the make-or-buy decision is a decision on how a firm will manage its supply chain 
(Henriksen et al., 2012). Processes and strategies that are core to the firm should remain 
within the firm (make), while those that are not core to the firm can be outsourced (buy) 
(Henriksen et al., 2012). Managers must consider several factors and theories to make the 
appropriate decision. Namely, it is important to have an understanding of transaction cost 
economics, core competencies, and competitive advantage, along with how these concepts 
shape a firm’s decisions.  
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) proposed three questions that must be answered when 
considering a make or buy decision: 
First, what is the potential for obtaining competitive advantage in this 
activity, taking account of transaction costs? Second, what is the potential 
vulnerability that could arise from market failure if the activity is 
outsourced? ... Third, what can we do to alleviate our vulnerability by 
structuring arrangements with suppliers to provide appropriate controls yet 
necessary flexibilities in demand. (p. 48)  
The answer to the first question necessitates an understanding of transaction costs, core 
competencies, and competitive advantage. The second and third questions require an 
internal Air Force analysis on acceptable risk profiles and market leverage to adequately 
address for other mission sets and may be fruitful areas of further research.  
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Firms engaging in strategic make-or-buy decisions must identify their core 
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). By examining any competitive advantages that 
arise from those competencies, firms can determine their continued relevance to the 
organization (Leonard-Barton, 1992). If competencies remain relevant to competitive 
advantage, the organization should remove these competencies from the make-or-buy 
analysis and retain them in-house. If irrelevant to competitive advantage, the organization 
should consider the competency with the bulk of other tasks that may potentially be 
outsourced. Then, the organization must conduct transaction cost analysis to better discern 
what tasks should be kept in-house and what may be outsourced (Williamson, 1996). 
B. TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transactions costs are the costs incurred by a firm in the process of conducting 
business (Chen, 2019). More specifically, transaction costs refer to costs associated with 
searching, communicating, and bargaining activities (Klein, 2013). Firms and 
organizations, including the Air Force, need to consider transaction costs when making 
decisions on how they conduct business. Consider a simple example where a business 
owner has determined that, although small, his business has grown large enough that it is 
no longer feasible for him to keep accurate accounting records using commercial off-the-
shelf software; the software is still effective, but he just does not have the time to do it. The 
business owner has two choices: he can hire someone to keep accounting records for him 
or he can hire an outside firm that specializes in keeping accounting records for small 
businesses. Hiring someone costs $10 in salary and the outside firm costs $9 in fees. 
Although at first glance it seems apparent that the logical choice would be to hire the 
specialized accounting firm, the business owner has not yet considered the transaction costs 
of his decision. Some of the transaction costs are likely to be shared, such as the time it 
takes to search for an employee, which may mirror the time it takes to conduct due 
diligence on a firm to hire.  
However, some costs may be singular to the outsourced firm, such as needing to 
communicate accounting information every month, or bargaining the workload to be 
carried. For example, a position description for an employee may read something similar 
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to “conduct accounting activities for all business transactions” and that should fulfill the 
owner’s needs perpetually or until the business grows large enough that the job is simply 
too much for one person and requires another. On the other hand, a contractual agreement 
with an outside firm is likely to be more limiting. There may be an agreed-upon limit to 
the number of records that the firm will process at the $9 rate. If the business grows, even 
marginally, the owner may need to conduct bargaining to ensure all of his records are 
accurately recorded. At the fundamental level, that costs time. Time, of course, is money 
or, in this case, transaction costs. If those transaction costs exceed $1, then hiring the firm 
may cost more to the business owner than the $10 salaried employee.  
The Nobel economist Ronald Coase first conceptualized the idea of transaction 
costs in his article “The Nature of the Firm,” published in 1937 (Klein, 2013). While 
Coase’s purpose for his article was to define the term firm, which, at the time, was widely 
used but ill-defined, he succeeded in doing more. Coase explained, “The main reasons why 
it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism” (1937, p. 390). The price mechanism to which Coase refers is the “invisible 
hand” specter that guides market transactions so that resources may flow to where they 
may be most efficiently utilized. Coase gave his abstract cost reference body by providing 
examples. The first such example is the cost of determining germane market pricing that, 
while able to be minimized through specialization (e.g., third-party pricing databases), 
cannot be avoided (Coase, 1937). Negotiating contracts for each transaction also represents 
a cost that firms can streamline although not eliminate completely (Coase, 1937). Coase 
did not explore every possible transaction cost, but he explained that executing transactions 
comes at a cost, and firms may reduce these transactions. 
Oliver Williamson (1981) expanded on Coase’s exploration of transaction costs by 
authoring “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach,” where he 
described these costs as the economic counterpart to friction. While one may look to 
moving mechanical parts of a machine and the friction experienced where parts meet to 
judge its efficiency, Williamson explained that economic friction may arise in how 
cooperatively, or uncooperatively, parties interact. Williamson opined that “transaction 
cost analysis is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of organizations that joins 
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economics, organization theory, and … contract law” (p. 573). Transactional costs are 
more than just a reason for the existence of firms; they drive the way firms make decisions.  
Williamson stated, “Whether a firm makes or buys—that is, produces for its own 
needs or procures a good or service from an outside supplier—turns largely on the 
transaction costs of managing the transaction in the firm, as compared with mediating the 
transaction through the market” (1996, p. 25). As discussed, these transaction costs 
represent the costs required to conduct business with outside vendors or to maintain the 
support infrastructure to fulfill the requirement organically. If filled organically, 
transaction costs can include training personnel, maintaining equipment, or similar costs 
(Coase, 1937). If outsourced, costs may be incurred for monitoring vendor performance or 
conducting lengthy negotiations (Coase, 1937). The firm must diagnose for itself what 
manner of fulfilling its need is most beneficial. 
C. CORE COMPETENCIES 
Core competencies are another integral part of a firm’s decision-making process. 
At its essence, a core competence embodies the strength of a firm and is typically 
something the firm has dedicated itself to perfecting. To borrow a definition from Melissa 
Schilling (2013), a core competency is “a harmonized combination of multiple resources 
and skills that distinguish a firm in the marketplace” (p. 117). To be successfully employed 
by a firm, Prahalad & Hamel identify three criteria a core competency must meet: 
• provide access to a wide variety of markets. 
• make a significant contribution to perceived customer benefits. 
• be difficult for competitors to imitate. (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, p. 7)  
If a firm’s competence does not meet all three criteria, or if the firm fails to 
continuously develop and invest in the competence, then the core competency will either 
have a short existence or fail to materialize at all.  
Requiring that the competency access a wide variety of markets only means that 
the desired competence should not be so niche as to be unemployable in other business 
areas. Take Amazon, for example. One of Amazon’s core competencies is customer 
service, or the customer experience as noted in their mission statement “to be the Earth’s 
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most customer-centric company” (Amazon Jobs, n.d.). A dominating drive to create the 
absolute best customer experience in the world led an online bookseller to become the 
largest online retailer of myriad goods and services and to expand into other markets such 
as Amazon Web Services (Cerasoli, Janousek, & Mills, n.d.). Amazon’s customer service 
competency readily satisfies the second criterion as well; shoppers enjoy and appreciate 
the ease with which they can maneuver and buy items on the website and the benefit to 
consumers is easy to identify (Cerasoli et al., n.d.). Perhaps unexpectedly, Amazon’s 
competency indeed satisfies the third criterion primarily because of the scale in which it 
influences how Amazon operates. No other retailer is as succesful as Amazon in creating 
a positive customer experience as evidenced by their position as the number one company 
with regards to customer experience (Feinberg, Benki, Berry, & Sylvester, 2018). This is 
what makes the competency so challenging for other firms to imitate.  
Rather than prioritize the individual business unit, Prahalad & Hamel (1990) argued 
that firms should prioritize building competencies across business units. Focusing on 
competencies, they argue, unlocks synergy throughout the firm (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
When a firm is able to grow and maintain core competencies, competitive advantages arise 
that give the firm an edge over its competition (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).  
Further developing the core competency concept, Quinn and Hilmer expanded to 
seven characteristics of effective core competencies: 
1. Skill or knowledge sets, not products or functions 
2. Flexible, long-term platforms—capable of adaptation or evolution 
3. Limited in number 
4. Unique sources of leverage in the value chain 
5. Areas where the company can dominate 
6. Elements important to customers in the long run 
7. Embedded in the organization’s systems. (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994, 
pp. 45–47) 
Comparing the two criteria list, similarities become evident. To satisfy Prahalad 
and Hamel’s requirement that core competencies access wide markets, it is sensible that 
skill or knowledge sets, not a unique product, would exist as a core competence (Quinn & 
Hilmer, 1994). To satisfy customers, it is practical that a competence not only focus on 
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service to customers but also be flexible to adjust to their customers as preferences change 
over time (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). 
Because core competencies are integral to firm strategies, firms do not intentionally 
outsource core competencies (Hudgens, 2008). Sometimes, core competencies may 
become unnecessary or harmful. Leonard-Barton (1992) defined harmful core 
competencies as “core rigidities” (p. 188) and explores how previously beneficial 
competencies can hinder the development of new or innovative capabilities. An 
organization would be well served to abandon, or limit the influence of, any competencies 
that have become problematic (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Core competencies not characterized by Leonard-Barton’s (1992) core rigidity 
problem should be performed by the firm. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) offer the example 
of Chrysler and Honda from the 1980s. Chrysler viewed its engine and powertrain 
components only as pieces of a larger whole, the vehicle. The firm sought to differentiate 
elsewhere and thus outsourced powertrain manufacture. Honda, on the other hand, sought 
to turn its engines into a core competency. The firm established this through its heavy 
investment in racing engines, which enabled the firm to recognize synergy in engine 
development research. Honda’s engines became defining characteristics. It would be 
senseless for Honda to outsource this core competency. 
D. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Also germane to understanding the make-or-buy analysis is the influence 
competitive advantages have in decision-making within firms. Competitive advantages 
arise when one firm is able to create more value through resource utilization than other 
companies, and these competitive advantages generally arise from a firm’s core 
competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). There are two different perspectives that are used 
to discuss competitive advantages: a resource-based perspective and an institutional 
perspective (Oliver, 1997).  
The resource-based perspective emphasizes that the resources available to a firm 
should shape how that firm secures a competitive advantage. According to Peteraf, the 
resource-based model consists of four conditions which must be met: 
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1. Resource heterogeneity  
2. Ex ante limits to competition 
3. Imperfect resource mobility 
4. Ex poste limits to competition. (Peteraf, 1993, pp. 180–185)  
We explore these in brief detail, but they are presented in no particular order. 
The first condition required for the resource-based view of competitive advantage 
is that resources must exist heterogeneously. That is, resources cannot be spread evenly 
throughout the field of firms (Peteraf, 1993). Barney (1991) offered positive reputations of 
firms as an example of resource heterogeneity. When only a handful of companies in a 
particular competitive market enjoy a positive reputation, their reputations exist as a rare 
resource (Barney, 1991). This resource is not immediately mobile nor equally enjoyed by 
all firms and therefore satisfies the first condition. 
A second condition that must be present is ex ante limits to competition. Peteraf 
(1993) explained that the meaning of this condition is that “prior to any firm’s establishing 
a superior resource position, there must be limited competition for that position” (p. 185). 
For example, take Apple’s introduction of the iPhone. Apple identified a differentiated 
market in the now-ubiquitous smartphone. With limited competition for the position, the 
firm swiftly and enduringly established dominance (Vogelstein, 2008).  
A third necessary condition is that of imperfect resource mobility, which essentially 
means resources are either completely immobile and cannot be traded, have individual use 
to a firm and no value to another, or they have more value within the firm than if they were 
traded out of the firm (Peteraf, 1993). Perhaps the most common imperfectly mobile, or in 
some cases perfectly immobile, resources are intangible resources such as intellectual 
property, patents, and manufacturing processes (Jurevicius, 2013). 
The fourth and final required condition are ex post limits on competition. Peteraf 
(1993) explained this condition as limiting factors on competition after a firm has achieved 
superior position exploiting immobile, heterogeneous resources, typically achieved 
through imperfect substitutability and imperfect imitability. Substitutability is easy to grasp 
just by looking at the paper towel shelves in your local grocer or department store. While 
some consumers may have brand preference or brand loyalty, thin absorbable paper 
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products are hardly exclusive. Imperfect imitability can be much more variable in what it 
may consist of, but for our purposes, think of it in similar terms as the intangible resources 
discussed above. Through the development of many interrelated trademarks, a firm may 
create brand recognition that other firms find inimitable. Or, as was the case with Toyota 
decades ago, their manufacturing process was inimitable and American firms struggled to 
compete (Bowen & Spear, 1999). 
The opportunities for competitive advantages emerge through the four conditions 
Peteraf (1993) outlined. The existence of the four conditions does not precipitate a firm’s 
competitive advantage in a market. It only enables a firm to seize a competitive advantage. 
Expert managers must still realize the opportunity to secure the upper hand (Peteraf, 1993). 
The institutional perspective of competitive advantage represents a different point 
of view. Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) suggested that economic rationality is not the sole 
driver of firm behavior but that social pressures can be just as influential as economic 
rationality. Instead of looking at resources, the institutional perspective focuses on social 
influences through accepted norms, values, and assumptions that society has deemed 
appropriate (Oliver, 1997). In practice, the influence of institutional theory concepts on 
firm behavior can impede or define competitive advantage practices (Oliver, 1997). 
A generic illustration of a sports star should serve as an adequate example of how 
the institutional perspective can influence decisions. A player, essentially a sole 
proprietorship firm, in a particular sport is a top player at his position. His current team 
gave him his first chance when he was a nobody, and now his contract with the team is 
ending. Although his team can afford to pay him a fair salary for another contract, he 
accepts less than half of his value, as compared to other top players, and signs with the 
same team (Manfred, 2013). By signing at a discount, his team has enough money to 
address other positional concerns (Manfred, 2013). Despite being economically better off 
choosing the higher salary, the player was influenced by societal values of loyalty and 
organizational belonging to accept less money (Manfred, 2013).  
It appears that the institutional perspective is not as deeply explored in the literature 
as the resource-based perspective. Oliver’s (1997) intention was not to juxtapose the two 
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theories but to present a combined model. Exploring that model, however, is not necessary 
for our brief overview of competitive advantage and the theories behind it. 
Since competitive advantages arise from core competencies, by definition, they 
cannot (or at least should not) be outsourced (Hudgens, 2008). A competitive advantage 
should be based on capabilities or resources that are heterogeneous and inimitable. If a firm 
were to successfully outsource a capability that it identified as a competitive advantage, 
two of the criteria that Peteraf identified as necessary are violated. 
E. GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Government and DoD outsourcing policy is rooted in U.S. Code. Further 
regulations and policies are implemented through national defense authorization acts 
passed by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in OMB Circular 
A-76 (OMB, 1999; Robbert, Gates, & Elliott, 1997). The document authorizes government 
insourcing in four distinct circumstances: no satisfactory commercial sources available, 
matters related to national defense, patient care, and lower cost (OMB, 1999). The OMB 
(1999) clarified that “the general policy of the Government [is] to rely on commercial 
sources to supply the products and services the Government needs,” (p. 1). Formal policy 
further states that “it is the policy of the United States Government to: achieve economy 
and enhance productivity, retain Governmental functions in-house, and rely on the 
commercial sector” (OMB, 1999, p. 1-2).  
The DoD relies on the national defense insourcing language to exclude 58% of 
640,000 positions conducting commercial activities from outsourcing (Robbert et al., 
1997). The same report cites several studies that identify savings, both from insourcing and 
outsourcing activities, ranging from 20% to 35%, although inconsistencies related to actual 
versus projected savings may exist (Robbert et al., 1997). DoD-specific policy is driven by 
two DoD Directives: 4100.15 Commercial Activities Program and DoD Instruction 
4100.33 Commercial Activities Program Procedures (Robbert et al., 1997). Directive 
4100.15 essentially parrots OMB Circular policy and assigns responsibilities to 
government positions, while Directive 4100.33 describes the procedures for determining 
whether government personnel or commercial sources should satisfy needs (Office of the 
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Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, 1985a; Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, 1985b). More 
recently, DoD Directive 1100.4 Guidance for Manpower Management (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics, 2005) detailed policy 
stating that “assigned missions shall be accomplished using the least costly mix of 
personnel (military, civilian, and contract) consistent with military requirements and other 
needs of the Department” (p. 3).  
Policy indicates that commercial activities not subject to the four exceptions should 
be outsourced to commercial activities. However, DoD Directive 1100.4 goes further and 
mandates that personnel address military needs with the least costly mix of labor, implying 
that DoD policy encourages outsourcing for cost reduction versus attempting to focus on 
core competencies (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
& Logistics, 2005).  
Air Force Policy Directive 38-1 (Secretary to the Air Force, 2019) echoes DoD 
Directive 1100.4 by also requiring the least costly mix of personnel to meet military and 
Air Force needs. One of the newer initiatives across the government and championed by 
the Air Force is category management. The Government-Wide Category Management 
Guidance Document (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015) contains no reference to 
core competencies or competitive advantages while returning 91 instances of “cost” and 
48 instances of “saving.” Given the policy documents, directives, and current focus on 
category management, it would appear that the government’s make-or-buy decisions are 




This chapter focuses on the case study methodology, what it is, why it was used, 
and how it was used. The first section introduces and defines the case study methodology. 
The second section identifies the three different types of case study and identifies the type 
we use in this study. The third section addresses some of the misunderstandings about case 
studies. The fourth section identifies the three types of data the research team collected on 
Kessel Run, why we collected each type, and what we hoped to learn from each. The fifth 
section discusses the data collection and analysis. The sixth section explains why our 
analysis and results can be trusted based on our chosen method. Finally, the seventh section 
identifies some limitations or weaknesses associated with our method.  
A. CASE STUDY METHOD 
 Definition 
This section introduces case study method by first defining it. It is difficult to find 
a consensus as to what a “case study” or even a “case” actually is. In the 2008 article “Case 
Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Levy stated that some would agree that 
a case is merely an “instance.” George and Bennett (2005) added to that concept, stating 
that a case is “an instance of a class of events” (p. 5). Levy stated that a case study is “an 
attempt to understand and interpret a spatially and temporally bounded set of events” 
(Levy, 2008, p. 2). George and Bennett (2005) defined a case study as “the detailed 
examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations 
that may be generalizable to other events” (p. 17). In 2018, Yin provided an arguably easier 
interpretation of the term.  
Yin (2018) stated that a “case study” is simply a certain kind of research method 
and a “case” is defined as the main focus of a case study, a “concrete entity (e.g., a person 
or group, organization, community, program, process, policy, practice, or institution, or 
events such as decisions)” (p. 286). The popularity of the case study method of research 
has greatly increased over time from a less “obscure mode of inquiry” to being better 
understood and valued (Yin, 2018, p. 14). The definition is also something that has 
20 
developed over time. Yin (2018) has been developing the definition over the five previous 
editions of his book, Case Study Research and Applications (6th ed.), and has been able to 
break it down into a twofold definition. The first part consists of the scope of a case study: 
1. The case study method is empirical, in that it: 
a. investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when  
b. the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly 
evident. (p. 15) 
The second part of the definition concerns the “methodological characteristics” 
(Yin, 2018, p. 15). Accordingly, the methodological characteristics become the features of 
the case study. Yin (2018) continued his definition with the following: 
2. A case study: 
a. copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will 
be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one 
result; 
b. benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide design, data collection, and analysis, and as another result; 
c. relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion. (p. 15) 
In the first bullet of the second part of his definition, Yin stated that “there will be 
many more variables of interest than data points” (p. 16). In regard to Kessel Run, the 
research team’s interest in the organization goes beyond data points such as cost savings 
(contract or otherwise), time savings (Procurement Action Lead Time [PALT]), and 
customer satisfaction; instead, our interest stems from a group’s ability and determination 
to practice intellectual and entrepreneurial freedom. The potentially explanatory variables 
of interest are numerous. The more variables of interest, the more complex the case and its 
context (Yin, 2018). 
 Types of Case Studies 
This section identifies case study types. Case studies typically exist in three distinct 
forms: descriptive, explanatory, or exploratory. Yin (2018) stated that the boundaries on 
when to use the different methods, or modes, are not always evident. He also added that 
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even though each of the types has its distinct characteristics, there can be large overlaps 
between them. Meaning, while there are instances when more than one mode could be 
used, the major mistake typically made is using one mode when another would be more 
advantageous (Yin, 2018). This case study focuses on an explanatory analysis of Kessel 
Run to provide background and rationale for its beginning. To support our choice of an 
explanatory study, we examine each of the case study types.  
a. Descriptive 
According to Case Study Research, a descriptive case study is “a study whose 
purpose is to describe a phenomenon (‘the case’) in its real-world context” (Yin, 2018, p. 
286). According to the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (n.d), the descriptive 
case study “uses a narrative-type framework that focuses on a real-world problem and 
provides essential facts about it, including relevant background information.” Furthermore, 
it “introduces readers to key concepts, policies, and tools (including quantitative tools) 
relevant to the question or problem.” Additionally, it “explains the solution, the process of 
implementing it, and the results.” Finally, it “offers analysis and evaluation of the chosen 
solution, its implementation, and the outcomes, including strengths and weaknesses, trade-
offs, and lessons learned” (Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, n.d., p. 1). 
b. Explanatory 
According to Case Study Research, an explanatory case study is a “study whose 
purpose is to explain how or why some condition came to be (e.g., how or why some 
sequence of events occurred or did not occur)” (Yin, 2018, p. 287). The type, or mode, to 
be used can be based on the research question and how the question was posed. For 
example, “how” and “why” questions are more explanatory which supports the use of the 
case study, history, or experiment as the preferred method of research (Yin, 2018). Case 
studies are preferred for “how” and “why” questions because these questions are good for 
examining an operational process over a time frame as opposed to examining or evaluating 
event frequencies or specific events (incidences) (Yin, 2018). Explanatory case studies rely 
on theory to provide the basis upon which a researcher forms and defends a position (Yin, 
2018). In such a case, the specific avenue is used to justify the researcher’s position. 
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c. Exploratory 
According to Case Study Research, an exploratory case study is “a study whose 
purpose is to identify the research questions or procedures to be used in a subsequent 
research study, which might or might not be a case study” (Yin, 2018, p. 287). In some 
instances, fieldwork and data collection are conducted prior to defining the research 
question and hypothesis. Tellis writes, “This type of study has been considered as a prelude 
to some social research” (1997, p. 7). Even though this type of study allows advanced 
fieldwork, it is still required to have the framework of the case study identified or developed 
ahead of time. These exploratory methods are useful in determining what final protocols 
are used in the subsequent research study (Tellis, 1997). 
 Misunderstandings about Case Study Research 
This section expands on case studies by identifying some of the misunderstandings 
about them. We wanted to confirm that the case study method was the right route to take 
when evaluating Kessel Run. When conducting research, we found that there were not only 
different types of case studies but also common misconceptions and misunderstandings 
about case study research. The following is what the team used to confirm that the case 
study method was the correct path to take.  
In “The Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” Flyvbjerg (2006) 
focused on the importance of case studies and set out to disprove five common 
misunderstandings about case study research, and to argue that the five 
“misunderstandings” are actually acceptable and sometimes necessary. Flyvbjerg’s 
specific argument in this article is “that a scientific discipline without a large number of 
thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of 
exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one” (p. 219). He was 
always told, 
“You cannot generalize from a single case,” some would say, “and social 
science is about generalizing.” Others would argue that the case study may 
be well suited for pilot studies but not for full-fledged research schemes. 
Others again would comment that the case study is subjective, giving too 
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much scope for the researcher’s own interpretations. Thus, the validity of 
case studies would be wanting, they argued. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 219) 
Flyvbjerg (2006) wanted to disprove these false assumptions about case studies. He 
presented and refuted five assumptions specifically: 
1. General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more 
valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge. 
2. One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, 
the case study cannot contribute to scientific development. 
3. The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in 
the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are 
more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building. 
4. The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency 
to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions.  
5. It is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions 
and theories on the basis of specific case studies. (p. 221) 
Flyvbjerg (2006) explained the difference between what one can learn from case 
studies as opposed to what one can learn from context-independent, or theoretical-type, 
studies, which would only bring one to a beginner’s level of understanding on the subject. 
Flyvbjerg reasoned that rule-based knowledge cannot comprise the highest level of 
education when it comes to a specific discipline, so the case study method of actual 
experiences with actual outcomes is critical to reaching higher levels of understanding and 
comprehension. Lastly, he addressed and refuted each specific false assumption. He 
provided several examples of current and historical events where case study analysis was 
critical in creating expertise in specific scientific disciplines, draws on other authorities 
who suggest case study research is valuable, and notes examples of single cases influencing 
scientific communities and research streams.  
Based on the arguments in favor of the case study method, we adopted the case 
study method for our study on Kessel Run. 
B. KESSEL RUN DATA COLLECTION AND DESIGN 
 Kessel Run Case Study Information and Data Collection 
This section identifies the data we collected, why it was collected, and what we 
hoped to learn from it. We collected information and data in three forms: 1) information 
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provided directly by the Kessel Run staff and leadership, including information posted on 
official Air Force websites, 2) information collected from interviews with Kessel Run 
members, and 3) information posted publicly by those outside of the organization.  
The first data is what was provided directly by the Kessel Run staff and leadership, 
whether supplied directly through email or posted on an official Air Force website. The 
information provided by the Kessel Run staff is information they use during the 
organization’s “Enablement Days.” The information the staff provided included 
presentations as well as supplemental background documents. According to two Kessel 
Run staff members, Enablement Days are monthly gatherings to “enable other 
organizations to understand and incorporate some of the lessons we’ve learned on our way 
to where we are today. These sessions are led by our Deputy Commander ... who will cover 
topics ranging from operations to contracting” (participant, personal communication, 
August 13, 2019). Additionally, as stated, the Enablement Days are “very beneficial to get 
an understanding of the history of Kessel Run and the [Commercial Off the Shelf] COTS 
vs [Government Off the Shelf] GOTS conversation” (participant, personal communication, 
August 13, 2019).  
We collected this data based on recommendations by the Kessel Run staff, who 
stressed the usefulness of the documents and presentations as being able to answer most of 
our questions. In addition to the information provided by the Kessel Run staff for 
Enablement Days, we also collected information from Kessel Run’s official website as well 
as official information released to the public for the same reason. As there can be multiple 
perspectives as to why and how Kessel Run was created, the leaders at Kessel Run want 
information released that is sanctioned by them because that is what they believe people 
outside of the organization should know. Accordingly, we collected additional data in other 
ways. 
The second form of data comes from responses to interview questions. We 
developed a list of interview questions structured to provide us with the data required to 
understand the creation of Kessel Run. After receiving approval through Kessel Run’s 
leadership and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board, the team sent 
out the interview questions to 10 participants. The team requested names and email 
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addresses of 10 personnel “who have been with the organization since the beginning and/
or people who have background knowledge of Kessel Run’s inception” (participant, 
personal communication, September 30, 2019). The participants were chosen by the chief 
of staff of Kessel Run and included six military and four civilian personnel. The military 
ranks and grades varied from junior to mid-level officers who filled both technical and 
leadership roles. The positions varied from “Product Lead” to “Branch Chief.” The four 
government civilians held equivalent roles and positions. We noted the selection of some 
of the junior ranking offers identified for the interview, surmising that the junior officers 
may have had limited exposure and background knowledge of Kessel Run’s inception. The 
chief of staff responded, “The list are those that have been with Kessel Run since its 
inception, or close thereto. They have quickly moved up the ranks and have excellent 
insight from a worker bee level to a more management role” (participant, personal 
communication, October 1, 2019). The response provided by the chief of staff satisfied the 
concerns of the research team. Per our request, in addition to the 10 personnel mentioned 
above, the interview questions were specifically sent to four senior leaders of Kessel Run, 
two lieutenant colonels and two civilians.  
The interview data was collected to document the opinions of the staff and members 
of Kessel Run. We wanted to know individual participant’s views on how Kessel Run was 
created, why it was created, and how it is doing so far. We wanted to assess similarities 
and disparities between their opinions and the information provided to the public through 
official venues. We hoped to obtain information, perceptions, and insight other than what 
is provided, posted, and vetted by leadership. We hoped to receive candid and elaborate 
responses from members who have lived and worked through the experience. These 
responses provide insights as to what happened during the decision meetings prior to the 
creation of the organization. They provide background into the make-or-buy decision, the 
transaction cost factors, or other insights as to why they decided to insource software 
development instead of outsource it.  
The third form of data we collected is that which is posted publicly by those outside 
of the organization. This specifically includes information, research, and opinions of others 
who have researched Kessel Run and who are not affiliated with the organization. This 
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information came from sources such as blogs, civilian websites, and other (non-Kessel Run 
related) government websites.  
We collected this data from external sources to identify reasons that were unknown 
or not documented in the data from within the organization. This outside, third-party 
perspective allowed us to compare and contrast with the data from within the organization. 
 Research Design—Steps Taken to Collect and Analyze the Data 
This section describes the steps we took to collect and analyze the data. Each of the 
three forms of data required its own individual methods of data collection analysis. The 
three forms of data are: 1) information provided directly by the Kessel Run staff and 
leadership to include information posted on official websites, 2) data collected from 
interviews from Kessel Run members, and 3) information posted publicly by those outside 
of the organization. We will elaborate on how we collected and analyzed the data in the 
following paragraphs.  
The first form of data came directly from the Kessel Run staff and leadership and 
included information posted on Air Force official websites. After being contacted, the 
Kessel Run staff was gracious in providing information on their organization. Due to their 
popularity, they created a monthly briefing called “Enablement Days,” designed to “enable 
other organizations to understand and incorporate some of the lessons we’ve learned on 
our way to where we are today. These sessions are led by our Deputy Commander ... who 
will cover topics ranging from operations to contracting” (A. Graham, personal 
communication, August 13, 2019). Additionally, Enablement Days are “very beneficial to 
get an understanding of the history of Kessel Run and the COTS vs. GOTS conversation” 
(H. Hunt, personal communication, August 13, 2019). The information was emailed to the 
research team by A. Graham on August 13, 2019. We also collected information posted on 
Air Force official websites. The research team was able to search “.gov,” “.mil,” and 
“.af.mil” websites through public networks to collect what Kessel Run leadership approved 
to be posted about the organization.  
The second form of data comes from responses to interview questions. We 
developed a list of interview questions structured to provide us with the information 
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required to understand the creation of Kessel Run. We interviewed Kessel Run staff and 
employees to get a non-leadership opinion on why Kessel Run was created and how it is 
doing so far. The team specifically wanted to send the interview questions via electronic 
mail (email) to give the respondents time to absorb the questions, gather their thoughts, 
and expand on their answers. Additionally, email responses would eliminate the need to 
transcribe the responses and reduce response misinterpretations.  
The third form of data is that which is posted publicly by those outside of the 
organization. This specifically includes posted information, research, and opinions of 
others who have researched Kessel Run and who are not affiliated with the organization.  
To streamline the analysis, we mirrored the research topics and areas for the first 
and third forms of data to that of the interview questions; this allowed the team to compare 
and contrast the data. The interview questions were as follows: 
1. What is your position/duty title? 
2. How long have you been with the organization? 
3. What is the purpose of Kessel Run?  
4. Why was Kessel Run created?  
5. What was the primary objective for developing Kessel Run?  
6. Outsourcing is the traditional method to procure software; how has 
outsourcing proved to be less effective?  
7. What were the major obstacles with developing Kessel Run?  
8. Did Kessel Run borrow ideas or concepts from other programs/
organizations? If so, what were they? 
9. Which programs get selected for insourcing vs. outsourcing? Please 
describe the program selection process.  
10. What is the status of Kessel Run? Is it meeting anticipated objectives?  
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11. How has Kessel Run impacted the Air Force’s software development 
capabilities?  
12. What are Kessel Run’s notable successes?  
13. What operational challenges has Kessel run experienced?  
14. What are some important metrics for Kessel Run and how were they 
developed? 
We developed these questions to better understand why Kessel Run was created, 
the purpose of its creation, and what factors went into the final decision to create a unique 
unit to insource a function in an organization (the Air Force) that traditionally outsources 
those functions. 
C. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND LIMITATIONS 
 Trustworthiness 
This section explains why our analysis and results can be trusted. We collected and 
analyzed three forms of information from several sources: 1) official information that was 
approved/released by Kessel Run leadership, 2) interview data from Kessel Run members 
and staff, and 3) data results and analysis from independent researchers not directly 
associated with Kessel Run. According to Yin (2018), when it comes to the collection and 
analysis of data, research teams can either focus on a single source of evidence or use 
multiple sources of evidence. Yin explained that using multiple sources of evidence is “a 
major strength of case study data collection” and has termed this method as “data 
triangulation” (2018). Although the use of multiple sources of evidence can be viewed as 
a burden, based on the perceived level of effort and aligning findings and conclusions, we 
view their use as critical when it comes to strengthening the construct validity of our case 
study. As Yin (2018) stated, “The multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon” (p. 128). The phenomenon our team wants to focus on 
is why the Air Force created an agency to insource software development when the 
traditional method is to outsource. Once our team collected the data from the three sources, 
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we compared the data to understand why Kessel Run was created. Our research team is 
confident that our analysis is trustworthy through the utilization of “data triangulation.” 
 Methodology Limitations or Weaknesses 
This final section identifies some limitations or weaknesses with our 
methodologies. The research team identified three limitations in the method of our 
research: 1) the newness of the Kessel Run organization, 2) the chosen respondents for the 
interview, and 3) the number of interview respondents. The first limitation is due to the 
recent stand-up of Kessel Run; meaning, there is not a lot of data in terms of its success 
and/or failures. The team chose an organization that is doing something revolutionary in 
terms of software development insourcing; however, is there going to be enough data to 
validate the results of this case study? Kessel Run is a fairly new organization, standing up 
as an independent organization in May 2018. It can be argued that, being in its infancy, it 
has not had enough time to perform in order for this research team to develop a fully 
informed opinion. On the other hand, since our focus is why and how the organization 
formed, this limitation might be less concerning. 
The second and third limitations involve the interview sources of evidence, one 
being the chosen respondents and the other being the number of respondents. We believe 
that utilizing Kessel Run staff and employees as respondents was the best way to get a non-
leadership perspective on why and how the organization came to be. That being said, we 
also believe that utilizing this specific pool of interviewees can also be a weakness; 
specifically, there could be a bias or group-think. To combat this limitation, the team made 
diligent effort to ask questions without biases and conduct interviews objectively; however, 
the interview subjects are all members of Kessel Run and are therefore likely to share 
similar perspectives on the organization. We also try to minimize the impacts of this 
limitation through our strategy of data triangulation. 
The second limitation concerning the interview respondents is the number of 
participants requested. Our goal was to receive between six and 10 responses. To receive 
this number, the team requested the names and emails of 10 individuals who were there 
during Kessel Run’s inception or that have knowledge about it. To ensure an adequate 
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number of responses was received, the team requested that the point of contact at Kessel 
Run, the chief of staff, forward the interview to four members of the leadership team. While 
we received adequate participation from a range of personnel, our small sample is 






IV. KESSEL RUN 
This chapter introduces the Kessel Run organization. The first section identifies 
when the organization stood up and why it stood up. The second section identifies the 
agency’s mission and vision. The third section explains how Kessel Run operates and 
where the organization is located. The fourth section discusses the organization’s function.  
A. KESSEL RUN: WHEN AND WHY  
The naming of Kessel Run comes from the movie Star Wars during the scene where 
the character Han Solo is showing his starship to Obi-Wan Kanobi. Han Solo tells Obi-
Wan that his starship is so fast that it did “the Kessel Run in less than 12 parsecs” (Kelman, 
2019b). The Air Force wanted a way to correlate the new organization with speed and 
agility, so they named the organization “Kessel Run” (Kelman, 2019b).  
Although Kessel Run stood up as an independent organization in May 2018, its 
inception started back in August 2017 and was initiated by the Targeting & Geospatial 
Intelligence (T&G) Modernization Program and the recently terminated Air Operations 
Center (AOC) 10.2 program (A. Graham, personal communication, August 13, 2019). 
According to the Kessel Run Acquisition and Contracting Playbook, which was provided 
to us via personal communication, Kessel Run was originally developed to fill a specific 
goal, which was to  
Deliver Air Operations Center (AOC) 10.2 Dynamic Targeting Mission 
Thread, including modern platform and automating associated 3rd party 
systems, alongside AOC 10.1 at 609th (AFCENT [Air Force Central 
Command]) in <12 months; initial delivery within 90 days of letting 
contracts ... nominally six (6) applications in initial phase. (A. Graham, 
personal communication, August 13, 2019)  
Kessel Run quickly expanded to T&G’s and AOC’s entire portfolio, which was a direct 
reflection of the value they provide. Now, they are a detachment within the Air Force Life 
Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC/HBH) (A. Graham, personal communication, 
August 13, 2019).  
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B. MISSION AND VISION 
According to the Kessel Run Acquisition and Contract Playbook (A. Graham, 
personal communication, August 13, 2019), the mission of Kessel Run is to “continuously 
deliver war-winning software our Airmen love.” Additionally, the vision of Kessel Run is 
to “build a software company that can sense and respond to conflict in any domain, 
anytime, anywhere” (A. Graham, personal communication, August 13, 2019). Upon 
reading the mission and vision, it is apparent the mission reads similar to civilian software 
development agencies, like Google, which highlight the importance of employee 
satisfaction and its correlation to productivity and creativity (Forbes Technology Council, 
2018). The vision is closer to the typical military vision, which incorporates the wartime 
(“conflict”) mission and rapid (“anytime”) deployment.  
According to a 2019 presentation from Lieutenant Colonel Jeremiah Sanders, 
“Kessel Run—The Agile Imperative,” Kessel Run provides the 24 “key capabilities” 
broken out into five capability categories. The Kessel Run team references the 24 
capabilities from Accelerate: The Science of Lean Software and DevOps: Building and 
Scaling High Performing Technology Organizations by Forsgren, Humble, and Kim 
(2018). The 24 capabilities are: 
Continuous Delivery Capabilities 
1. Version control all prod [sic] artifacts 
2. Automate deployment process 
3. Continuous Integration 
4. Trunk-based development 
5. Test automation 
6. Manage test data 
7. Shift left on security 
8. Continuous Delivery 
Architecture Capabilities  
9. Loosely coupled architecture 
10. Architect for empowered teams 
Product and Process Capabilities 
11. Customer (end-user) feedback 
12. Workflow visible through value stream 
13. Small batch sizes 
14. Enable team experimentation 
Lean Management and Monitoring Capabilities 
15. Lightweight change approval process 
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16. App & infrastructure monitoring inform business decisions 
17. Proactive system health checks 
18. Work-in-process limits 
19. Visualize work to monitor quality and communicate throughout the 
team 
Cultural Capabilities 
20. Westrum-style generative culture 
21. Encourage and support learning 
22. Support and facilitate collaboration across teams 
23. Provide resources and tools that make work meaningful 
24. Support or embody transformational leadership. (Forsgren, Humble, & 
Kim 2018) 
These capabilities allow the Kessel Run organization to “innovate for the future” and to 
create value for the Air Force and the warfighter (Sanders, 2019). Some of the value that 
Kessel Run creates includes providing 18 capabilities in operations, saving “$13M and 
~2,350 man-hours per month in Target Development, Air Battle Plan Development, 
Execution and Mission Reporting” (Sanders, 2019).  
In regard to the development and delivery of software, some of the results that 
Kessel Run has observed include: 1) average time from concept to operations of 
approximately 4.5 months, 2) reduction of lead time from give years to 3.5 days, 3) the 
ability to push continuous authority to operate to the secure network in less than one hour, 
4) an observed production deployment frequency (capabilities to operations) of 42 
capabilities per month, and numerous other improvements and accomplishments (Sanders, 
2019).  
C. LOCATION AND OPERATION 
Kessel Run operates as a detachment of the Air Force Life Cycle Management 
Center (AFLCMC), which is located at Hanscom Air Force Base (AFB), Boston, MA. 
Kessel Run’s experimental lab, however, is located in Boston’s North End in a shared 
workspace (Newell, 2018; Ward, 2019). This location appears to be chosen explicitly to 
attract workplace talent (see Chapter V for details; Pomerleau, 2019).  
To determine how Kessel Run operates, we analyzed how a product goes from 
inception (request) to operation (delivered to warfighter). The team used a project that 
Kessel Run did for Air Combat Command (ACC) that went from inception to operation 
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within 88 days, which was the fastest time through Kessel Run to date (Sanders, 2019). 
The team observed that there were 11 steps/phases to Kessel Run’s operation. Steps 1–4 
were completed collaboratively between Kessel Run and ACC and resulted in a “Vader 
Sprint Review,” which addresses risks. Steps 5–7 were completed solely by Kessel Run 
and considered the “Growth” period. Steps 8–11 appear to be testing and release phases, 
or something known as the “Notional Continuous Delivery + Parallel Test Construct” 
(Sanders, 2019):  
1. Value Stream Mapping 
2. Impact Mapping 
a. Identify Target Condition 
b. Key Performance Indicators 
3. Opportunity Backlog 
a. Prioritized, Validated Backlog 
4. Vader Sprint  
a. De-risking Analysis to Scoping Growth Board 
5. Product Scoping 
a. Product Team Resource Allocation 
6. Discovering and Framing 
a. Prioritized Backlog 
b. Identify Solution Hypothesis 
7. Inception 
a. Review of the Determinations and Findings 
b. Development Kick-Off 
8. “Testable” 
a. First “Push to SIPR” (Secret Internet Protocol Router) 
9. “Useable” 
a. Beta Test 
10. “Useful” 
a. Initial User Adoption 
11. “Joyful”  
a. User Adoption 
b. Legacy Sunset. (Sanders, 2019) 
D. FUNCTION 
According to Lt Col Sanders’s presentation, Kessel Run delivers “user-centered 
design with lean product development, modern cloud-native web-based mission 
capabilities, managed application programming interface (API) services with event stream 
data architecture, Air Force Command and Control (C2) common platform (Kessel Run 
Enterprise Services)” (Sanders, 2019).  
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According to its website (n.d.), Kessel Run practices “Lean Product Development,” 
“Extreme Programming,” and “User Centered Design” (Kessel Run, n.d.). Being lean, the 
website states, allows them to “validate our assumptions and mitigate risk at every turn.” 
Extreme programming allows them to “always feel confident to go fast, forever.” Their 
user-centered approach ensures that they “are always delivering value to our users” (Kessel 
Run, n.d.). It is apparent that, because of the Air Force’s mission, they pride themselves on 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Our analysis includes three forms of data: 1) information provided directly by the 
Kessel Run staff and leadership, including information posted on official Air Force 
websites, 2) information collected from interviews from Kessel Run members, and 3) 
information posted publicly by those outside of the organization. The information collected 
from Kessel Run includes their official website and information Kessel Run uses in its 
Enablement Days. Enablement Days are events that Kessel Run organizes to transmit 
information to the public about the organization. We obtained four interview responses 
after requesting participation from 14 individuals. The four participants ranged from 
approximately seven months of experience to two and a half years of experience in the 
organization. The information posted publicly by those outside of the organization includes 
news outlets and bloggers that are not affiliated with Kessel Run.  
A. RATIONALE FOR THE CREATION OF KESSEL RUN 
 Purpose and Primary Objective 
As discussed in the introduction and literature review, federal policy states that 
commercially available requirements should be contracted out and cost comparisons 
should be conducted to the maximum extent practicable to determine the best organization 
for fulfilling a requirement (OMB, 1999). With that being said, we thought that cost might 
have been an important driver in reverting to developing software in-house rather than 
outsourcing to contractors. We conducted a spend analysis (Pandit & Marmanis, 1967) that 
shows that the acquisition cost of software development has been increasing in the Air 
Force. However, Kessel Run’s official statements and interviews suggest another 
motivation, because cost does not appear to be relevant or at the forefront of their minds. 
According to Kessel Run’s official website (n.d.), the organization’s purpose and mission 
is “continuously delivering war-winning software our airmen love.” Additionally, none of 
the participants mentioned costs as a primary motivation. When asked, “What is the 
purpose of Kessel Run?” interview respondents had similar sentiments of the 
organization’s purpose: changing the way the Air Force delivers software by continuous 
38 
delivery and delivering software the warfighters love. According to one interview response, 
“Kessel Run is modernizing the Air Operations Center Weapon System through user-
centered design, lean start up management and other industry best practices. Our mission 
is to build and deliver software that warfighters LOVE” (Participant A). Another interview 
response claimed the purpose was “to change the way the Air Force and DoD delivers 
software” (Participant B). Furthermore, the third interview response agreed the 
organizational purpose was “to continuously deliver war winning software that the 
warfighter loves” (Participant C). Finally, the last interview respondent reported, “To build 
the capacity to sense and respond to a changing threat environment with software. While 
we build products that warfighters love, we could throw those products out the window 
and still have the ability to deliver combat capability. That is the true power of Kessel Run” 
(Participant D). 
 Spend Analysis 
We performed a spend analysis that revealed that costs of traditionally procured 
software development have exponentially increased in recent years. We used the Computer 
Program and Software Development North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code 541511 because we concluded that it was most aligned with Kessel Run’s 
mission. Furthermore, we used NAICS code 541511 because the alternative Product and 
Service Code (PSC) classification system was more confusing and did not provide a clear 
PSC for software development. The spend analysis was conducted with Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS) and Air Force Business Intelligence (AFBIT) 
Competency Cell data (AFBIT, n.d.; FPDS-NG, n.d.). While FPDS-NG contains data for 
all sectors of government contracting, the data pulled from FPDS-NG only included the 
Contracting Office Agency identification code 5700, which represents Air Force 
contracting offices. Both FPDS-NG and AFBIT data were separately sorted in 
chronological order and adjusted for inflation. We converted the raw FPDS-NG and AFBIT 
data into 2017 and 2018 dollars, respectively, by factoring in the appropriate Consumer 
Price Index figure from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Department of Labor, n.d.). 
Furthermore, we plotted each data on a graph where the Y-axis shows the obligation or 
spend amount and the X-axis represents years pertinent to the data. A trendline and 
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equation were generated to define the slope that provides the average change in obligation 
or spend amount and the best-fit R-squared value for each sample. Figure 1 represents 
FPDS-NG data measured by obligated dollars from FY2011 to FY2017 and concluded 
with an average increase of approximately $90 million per year, with an R-squared value 
of 0.7745. 
 
Figure 1. FPDS-NG Data Spend Analysis of NAICS 541511 from 
FY2011–2017 with a Trendline. Adapted from FPDS-NG (n.d.). 
Figure 2 represents AFBIT data measured by spend amount from FY2014 to FY2018 
and concluded with an average increase of approximately $100 million per year, with an 
R-squared value of 0.9392.  
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Figure 2. AFBIT Data Spend Analysis of NAICS 541511 from 
FY2014–2018 with a Trendline. Adapted from AFBIT (n.d.). 
The second spend analysis with AFBIT data verifies the Air Force’s aggressive 
increase in average dollars per year spent on software development under NAICS code 
541511. While both sets of data have relatively high best-fit R-squared values, indicating 
that the trendlines are more representative of the data than not, a limitation was identified 
because the values for FY2014–FY2017 are different between the two sources of data, 
FPDS and AFBIT. This discrepancy calls the sources of the data into question and provides 
the appearance of data manipulation before we extracted the data. While limitations to this 
spend analysis should be acknowledged, these are the official data sets that document 
government spending for the federal government and the Air Force respectively, and thus 
represent the best sources of data available. Additionally, both sets of data presented an 
indisputable substantial increase in Air Force computer programming and software 
development spending over the years at an average of $90 million and $100 million per 
year. The spend analysis yields compelling results that could explain the adoption of more 
agile software development methods by Air Force leaders, such as the creation of Kessel 
Run. 
 AOC 10.2 
When asked, “Why was Kessel Run created?” three of four respondents mentioned 
AOC 10.2. One respondent reported, “Kessel Run was built out of the ashes of a $500M 
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effort to modernize the AOC Weapon System, originally called AOC 10.2. After spending 
10 years and $500M and delivering absolutely nothing, Congress canceled the program” 
(Participant A). Another interview response was, “The failed 10.2 program [AOC 10.2] 
opened the door to prove out a different way of software development and delivery” 
(Participant C). Thirdly, “AOC 10.2 failed to deliver any working software in 10 years. … 
Rather than continue the old way of doing things, we decided to take the bull by the horns 
and build software in partnership with industry. That way, the government owns the code 
and can modify the code as necessary without contracting actions” (Participant D). AOC 
10.2 was a project the Air Force contracted with Northrop Grumman to upgrade the Air 
Operations Center network (Insinna, 2017). After not receiving a finished product in 10 
years and spending over $500 million, Congress decided to quit funding the program and 
the Air Force canceled the project to seek an alternative solution (Insinna, 2017). Flowing 
from this failure, the Air Force launched AOC Pathfinder, which would include “an agile 
software development technique called DevOps” and “industry best practices” (Insinna, 
2017, para. 3 & 4). Per the interview responses, one respondent explained that Kessel Run 
was formally known as AOC Pathfinder. Furthermore, one respondent clarified, “Congress 
cancelled the program and created the AOC Pathfinder, now known as Kessel Run” 
(Participant A). 
 Agile and Organic Capability 
According to bloggers, agile and organic capability seem to be the primary focuses 
of Kessel Run. Following are two separate bloggers, Steve Kelman (a Harvard faculty 
member and a former administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy) in the 
Federal Computer Week and the other from Defense Acquisition University (DAU; DAU, 
2019; Kelman, 2019b). While expressed in different words, both posts similarly claim that 
Kessel Run is primarily focused on agility and organic capability. Kelman claimed Kessel 
Run leverages “both the use of agile and an increasing role for organic capacity in software 
development—two issues that are not so related but are being pursued together under the 
moniker ‘Kessel Run’” (Kelman, 2019b, para. 1). Furthermore, the DAU blog post said 
that its “non-standard approach is designed to do two things, speed up the acquisition 
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process and turn the Air Force into a software company that happens to fly planes” (DAU, 
2019, para. 2). 
Of the two aforementioned focuses, agility is very apparent because it is even 
perceived from Kessel Run’s organizational name itself. Kelman’s blog explains:  
The Kessel Run moniker itself, of course, comes from the original Star Wars 
movie. In one scene Han Solo is showing Obi-Wan Kanobi [sic] his 
starship, trying to convince the Jedi of its speed. “You’ve never heard of the 
Millennium Falcon?” he says. “It’s the ship that made the Kessel Run in 
less than 12 parsecs.” So for the Air Force, Kessel Run meant speed, which 
is what the Air Force was trying to do with agile. (Kelman, 2019b, para. 12) 
Focusing so heavily on agility has been a struggle for the DoD, which has been bounded 
by the slow, bureaucratic style of the traditional acquisition system. According to an 
interview with Lt Col Jeremiah Sanders, the DAU blog revealed, “Traditional acquisition 
and software development can’t keep up with the rate of change or challenges from our 
enemies” (DAU, 2019, para. 3). According to Defense News, Air Force Secretary Heather 
Wilson admitted that the DoD and Air Force are “terrible at buying software,” but she 
added that “Kessel Run was changing that paradigm” (Insinna, 2019, para. 10). When 
asked, “How has outsourcing proven to be less effective?” the frustrations toward the 
traditional acquisition method can be summed up in two areas: 1) we do not own the work 
and intellectual property, and 2) the process is long and cumbersome. Two of the 
respondents went even further to explain that software development requirements normally 
take so long that, with the changing pace of the environment and needs, the requirement is 
inadequate or irrelevant once delivered to the warfighter. According to an article in 
C4ISRnet, Air Operations Branch Chief Adam Furtado stated, “Most of the things we’re 
doing here are highly logical; … it has taken us a long time to figure out all of the 
mechanisms behind it to get there” (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 14). Furthermore, commercial 
industry generally adopted these processes about a decade ago (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 14). 
From the data gathered, it appears that the DoD is well aware their software development 
practices are outdated and unable to effectively enable the mission. 
According to the Federal Computer Week blog, the organic capability was more 
coincidental than intentional (Kelman, 2019b). As the Program Executive Officer Digital, 
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Steve Wert was more concerned with improving agility no matter the mix of government 
and contractor blend (Kelman, 2019b). Furthermore, he elaborated, “We were primarily 
looking to demonstrate that modern commercial practice could be successfully applied at 
scale with the DoD” (Kelman, 2019b, para. 10). As indicated by one of the interview 
responses, owning the work and intellectual property and knowing software development 
practices is instrumental in Kessel Run’s effectiveness. As one respondent reports, “Having 
in-house expertise ensures that the Government owns the code baseline and the product 
development … The other element is that when we do contract with companies to provide 
service-based support, we have the in-house technical ability to assess whether a company 
is performing appropriately” (Participant A). 
As demonstrated above, the agility and organic capability appear to be important to 
Kessel Run and represent a completely different approach to how the DoD normally 
operates regarding software development. Furthermore, cost does not seem to be a major 
point of concern when it comes to agility. However, interview respondents were frankly 
concerned that the slow delivery of software through traditional approaches hinders the 
warfighter from obtaining relevant software. An interview respondent explained, “The 
information we’re planning off of has changed and may no longer be valid or important” 
(Participant B). Another respondent answered, “Traditional acquisitions lends itself to a 
waterfall approach, i.e., requirements, contract award, development, test, security, 
compliance, and then fielding. This sequence of events takes more than ten years on 
average. This means that the warfighter goes 10+ years without the software they need” 
(Participant D). The fact that the warfighter is not supported appropriately because of 
acquisition bureaucracies and inefficiencies is extremely alarming and the Air Force has 
recognized this deficiency. 
In their exploration to discover the best solution, the Air Force created Kessel Run 
to put their Airmen through coding training and make them as competent as Silicon Valley 
software developers (Kelman, 2019b; WTOP, 2019). According to Kelman’s blog, “Wert 
did not originally have in-house software developers on his staff. They used some airmen 
already at Hanscom, and supplemented this by finding airmen coders throughout the Air 
Force (usually not working in acquisition) and training them on agile through a six-month 
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temporary duty assignment” (Kelman, 2019b, para. 11). Washington’s Top News stated, 
“Part of this revolution in ‘how things are done’ was to build a software lab in Boston that 
was modeled after successful Silicon Valley companies” (WTOP, 2019, para. 8).  Interview 
subjects reported several benefits to airmen trained on software development in lieu of 
outsourcing: 
• Owning the software and intellectual property 
• Reduction in the contractor’s competing goals 
• Government open source model enables sharing between teams 
• Efficient tactical strategic execution with government code repository 
• Ability to assess contractor’s performance (Participants A, B, and D) 
B. METHODS USED TO DESIGN KESSEL RUN 
 Basis of Inception 
Interviewees’ responses revealed a couple of notable trends when asked, “Did 
Kessel Run borrow ideas or concepts from other programs/organizations? If so, what were 
they?” To sum up these trends, 1) Kessel Run got their ideas from industry, and 2) most 
respondents listed literature that was important to inception of Kessel Run. 
According to the DAU blog post, “The Kessel Run Experimentation Lab is not your 
typical DoD program—it’s not located on a military installation, you won’t see anyone 
wearing a suit and it’s driven by an almost frenetic need to innovate” (DAU, 2019, para. 
1). Furtado explains, “We’re battling industry, especially in Boston, for top end tech talent. 
… You can’t ask people to hey come and take a $30,000 pay cut also it’s going to be a bad 
environment and you’re not going to be happy here” (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 5). 
Defense.gov summarizes the “New Workforce” with three facts: 1) born between 1980–
2000, 2) prefers cities or large towns, and 3) would trade other benefits for better workspace 
(Newell, 2018). Kessel Run is challenged to interface with and develop methods to attract 
millennials in that workforce (Newell, 2018). Consequently, Kessel Run operates out of a 
“brightly lit We Work office” in Boston (Ward, 2019, p. 59). Defense.gov revealed, 
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“WeWork’s shared innovation space in Boston’s North End is usually home to constantly 
shifting startup companies, but the T-shirt-and-jeans-wearing airmen milling around its 
fully-stocked kitchenette sounded a bit different from their similarly dressed office mates. 
… This shared space, occupied by a smattering of startups, will also serve as the Air Force’s 
Kessel Run Experimentation Lab (KREL)” (Newell, 2018, para. 2). 
Not only did the Air Force adopt industry’s practices to attract top tech talent, but 
Kessel Run also took a page out of industry’s coding practices by employing continuous 
delivery methods (Johnson, 2019). As previously stated, the waterfall approach of 
traditional acquisitions takes years. According to an interview response, “There are 
numerous companies who continuously deliver software. Even though we’re the 
government, why couldn’t we get to a state where we were also able to do it. Companies, 
such as Amazon, Google, and Pivotal, have provided numerous lessons learned that we can 
use to grow” (Participant D). Using continuous user feedback loops, continuous delivery 
means software is delivered in weeks and is reiterated to make it better throughout its use. 
It is not a final end-product that takes years to deploy without effective feedback 
mechanisms (Johnson, 2019). One of Kelman’s blogs includes an interview with Colonel 
Enrique Oti at the Code for America Summit (Kelman, 2018). Colonel Oti is now the 
detachment commander for Kessel Run and explained to Kelman, “Continuous testing of 
increments of software is crucial to speeding up deployment, and prevents the do-loop of 
software not being tested till the end, problems discovered, and a cycle of fixes and re-
tests. It is never perfect the first time around, but changes can be made based on feedback 
from initial use” (Kessel Run, n.d.; Kelman, 2018, para. 12).  
In addition to the Enablement Days presentation entitled “Kessel Run Agile 
Imperative,” interview respondents listed literature important to the development of Kessel 
Run. The following is a list of the literature that was mentioned in either forum: 
• Start Up Way 
• Development and Software Operations (DevOps) Research and 
Assessment (DORA)—State of DevOps 
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• Accelerate: Building and Scaling High Performing Technology 
Organizations 
• Sense and Respond 
• How Google Works 
• Lean Enterprise 
• The Lean Startup 
• Extreme Programming 
• Design Thinking 
The continuous delivery method mentioned in the previous paragraph is aligned with 
DevOps, which initially produces a “minimally viable product” (Rosenberg, 2019, para. 
5). According to Chaillan, the co-director of the DoD Enterprise Development, Cyber 
Security, and Software Operations (DevSecOps) Initiative, “When you add cybersecurity 
experts to this process, working alongside both the developers and the users/operators from 
the beginning to ensure the code isn’t easily hacked, DevOps becomes DevSecOps” 
(Rosenberg, 2019, para. 6). According to one participant, “Kessel Run utilizes industry and 
Silicon Valley best practices like lean start up management, user-centered design, and 
DevSecOps” (Participant A). One respondent emphasized that The Lean Startup “was 
essentially our Bible” (Participant D). The Air Force was ultimately launching its own tech 
startup with Kessel Run, and these books provide insight on how they began building the 
organization. As one respondent noted, “We were very scrappy at the beginning. As a 
product designer, I used my personal laptop to get the job done” (Participant D). That 
statement provides a clearer picture of Kessel Run as a startup and how it shares similar 
struggles with other tech startups. 
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 Organizational Metrics 
In accordance with an interview response, “These [metrics] collectively allow us to 
gauge the health of our software development and deployment. Our actions have 
significantly improved these metrics as compared to baseline from which we started” 
(Participant D). While one interview in particular provided more details than the others 
regarding the organization’s metrics, all respondents listed the four Software Delivery 
Performance Metrics from Accelerate: 
• Deployment Frequency 
• Lead Time 
• Mean Time to Restore 
• Change Failure Rate 
These metrics were also mentioned in the Kessel Run Agile Imperative briefing. 
Moreover, the briefing categorizes the Software Delivery Performance Metrics as 
measuring the process and mentions an additional metric for measuring the outcome called 
“The One Metric That Matters (OMTM).” This metric answers the question posed by the 
chief of staff of the Air Force: “What combat capability are you delivering?” (Sanders, 
2019). The purpose of the OMTM is to “drive dynamic resource decisions” (Sanders, 
2019). One of the interview respondents defines it as “the ‘north star’ which determines 
whether a product is bringing user value” (Participant A). Along with these metrics, one 
respondent expressed interest in calculating Kessel Run’s personnel turnover rates because 
“I [Participant D] want to make Kessel Run the place where people want to come and 
work” (Participant D). This metric could help the organization understand whether 
members in the organization are dissatisfied and identify ways to retain personnel, which 
seems to be their most important resource. Likewise, it is interesting that cost is not 
included as a significant metric to Kessel Run, neither included in the Enablement Days 
resources nor mentioned by the interviewees; we had initially considered cost important 
based on our spend analysis results. The organization may be performing cost efficiently 
enough that cost is not a significant concern to them, or they might be leveraging improved 
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practices to reduce costs; however, it appears that no metric exists to validate either 
statement.  
 Obstacles and Challenges 
An organization like Kessel Run had obstacles and challenges it had to overcome 
in order to gain the position it has today and the recognition it has received. The interview 
respondents primarily keyed in on the obstacle of gaining senior leadership’s trust, and the 
challenge most interviewees disclosed was communication among all of the stakeholders. 
The obstacle most mentioned in the interviews was gaining the Air Force 
acquisition leader’s trust in taking a new approach in DoD software development. As stated 
by one respondent, 
The hardest part was gaining senior leaders’ trust on a completely different 
approach. ... not doing requirements-based development was a radical 
change for them. We had to convince leadership to allow us to talk to our 
users, cloud enabled IT can provide mission assurance, test and security can 
be incorporated into the development process, and we should use 
commercial IaaS [Infrastructure as a Service] and PaaS [Platform as a 
Service] instead of trying to build our own. Also, had to be honest with them 
that our culture and infrastructure suck so bad it’s [impeding] success for 
innovation, culture sucks because we have way too many gates before we 
can get to the user (lack of trust) and engineers are just watching people 
work and infrastructure because we can’t develop software and attract top 
talent in our crumbling infrastructure at Hanscom afb [Air Force Base] (both 
networks and facilities). (Participant C) 
Another respondent shared, 
Fear of the unknown. Most of the senior leaders in AF acquisitions have 
been in their profession a long time. As people grow in their career, they 
generally become more risk adverse because there is no incentive to take 
risks. Taking risks is actually a disincentive. A shift from being completely 
requirements driven to a combination of what I call big “R” requirements 
(as laid out by ACC) and small “R” requirements (gathered through user-
centered design) was met with much skepticism. Accepting that we don’t 
know everything upfront was quite the mindset shift. We learn more as we 
iterate. We had to educate senior leadership about how not knowing 
everything upfront and then building things in small increments buys down 
the level of risk you incur. In addition to fear of the unknown, we had a 
culture that didn’t optimize for doing the best thing for the user. 
Recognizing that culture had a lot of room for improvement allowed us to 
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make the necessary changes to be more user-focused, attract top talent, and 
make decisions based on ideas and context, not rank. (Participant D) 
As previously mentioned, Kessel Run is taking a new approach to software development 
across both the Air Force and the DoD. While it may seem like the obstacle Kessel Run 
faced is nothing special, it is a considerable stumbling stone when trying to be agile. As 
another interview expressed, “It makes it difficult sometimes to get things done” 
(Participant A). 
Kessel Run has a couple of years under its wings now and its first software 
development project, Jigsaw, “saves $12M a month in fuel costs based on a more efficient 
process” (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 10); however, it faces continuing challenges with 
communication, or as one respondent put it simply, “Getting all the players on board with 
clear messaging” (Participant B). 
Interacting with customers can also be a challenge. Kessel Run’s portfolio of 
software development spans across multiple Air Operation Centers. According to one 
interview response, “Each AOC operates differently and not according to doctrine. As we 
scale out our capabilities to other AOCs we are gathering new feedback and building new 
features to obtain user adoption at other sites” (Participant C). Another respondent 
explained, 
Each AOC thinks they are a snowflake. The commonalities we’ve 
discovered through our research process show otherwise, but no one wants 
to be told they aren’t special. The key is balancing the special needs of user 
bases while building out an enterprise solution and proving that to our users. 
Many of our users are skeptical because they’ve been using shitty software 
and workarounds for 20+ years. It’s hard to imagine a reality where modern 
software enables you do to do your job more effectively and efficiently 
across the globe. (Participant D) 
The challenges faced in Kessel Run seem to be generally directed toward their users at the 
AOCs; however, while they may have issues with interfacing with AOCs, the AOCs appear 
to be a priority to Kessel Run as users. 
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 Successes and Impacts 
When asked “What are Kessel Run’s notable successes?” three respondents 
mentioned the continuous Authority to Operate (ATO) and two respondents mentioned 
psychological safety between the variety of responses. For example, one participant’s 
explanation regarding continuous ATO was, “We have achieved continuous delivery on 
SIPR for the AOC. To do this we have a continuous ATO and have embedded the DT 
(Developmental Test)/OT (Operational Test) testers into our development teams” 
(Participant C). Additionally, another participant said, “Continuous ATO on SIPR to 
enable us to achieve continuous delivery. The timeline to push to production has dropped 
dramatically as a result of what a continuous ATO of our platform has done for us” 
(Participant D). According to an article, 
One unexpected area of success the team has generated is achieving the first 
continuous authority to operate on DoD networks. The authority to operate 
is a process by which entities are granted permission to connect systems to 
federal networks following a variety of validated security steps. A 
continuous authority means solutions and software fixes go up on the 
network immediately without having to jump through the validation hoops 
each time. As a result, this means solutions get to warfighters faster given 
they go up to the network immediately rather than waiting through the 
process. (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 12) 
In sum, Continuous ATO is a best practice adopted from industry which replaces the 
process of testing all of the code at the end of the project and makes developing software 
quicker (Pomerleau, 2019). Essentially, Continuous ATO allows Kessel Run to constantly 
be working instead of waiting for approvals, which can take time. 
Secondly, one of the interview responses regarding psychological safety is quoted 
here: 
Things like psychological safety are valued so the most optimal decisions 
can be made. The traditional military hierarchy that enabled Platoon leaders 
to navigate the jungles of Vietnam don’t work for a modern software 
organization. The highest ranked person doesn’t always have the context or 
knowledge to make or inform the decision; our flat management structure 
at the product team level allows decisions to be made by the right people. 
(Participant D) 
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Psychological safety appears to be very important to the organization and its success. While 
obtaining a list of interview participants and when asked to briefly explain how the list of 
names were selected, a key informant responded, “At Kessel Run, we don’t concern 
ourselves with rank. We put the best people in the roles, whether they are an E-5 or a 2Lt 
(Second Lieutenant)” (participant, personal communication, October 1, 2019). 
Furthermore, one blogger reported, “It is not every 36-year Air Force old-timer who is 
willing to listen to kids in hoodies, and even to allow them to name a pet project after a 
favorite Star Wars trope. (Kudos to the Air Force as well for not squelching this name.)” 
(Kelman, 2019b, para 19). This enables Kessel Run’s innovation and ability to obtain 
useful information from any source without dealing with the same bureaucracy witnessed 
in the rest of the Air Force and DoD. 
When asked “How has Kessel Run impacted the Air Force’s software development 
capabilities?” many of the respondents noted that Kessel Run pioneered a different way to 
deliver software to the Air Force and former Kessel Run members launched more software 
factories in the Air Force, including: 
• Section 31 
• BESPIN 
• LevelUp 
• SpaceCamp (Participants C and D) 
One respondent answered, “The largest impact is the conversation Kessel Run has 
started” (Participant B). By leading the way for change in Air Force software development, 
Kessel Run has started the conversation of operating differently and adopting industry’s 
best practices and enabled the potential for more radical changes in the military. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 Rationale for Kessel Run’s Inception 
One of the research questions we set out to answer in this case study was, “Why 
did the Air Force decide to internally develop (insource) software using the Kessel Run 
organization in lieu of the traditional method of contracting for software (outsource)?” 
Initially, we believed that rising software development costs drove the desire to create 
Kessel Run. Viewed through the lens of the make-or-buy decision, it appeared that the 
decision to insource made sense from a cost perspective. Based on spend data analysis, the 
cost of contracting for software development has increased dramatically over the last five 
years. As the failed AOC 10.2 project demonstrated, the cost of capabilities the Air Force 
sought to procure far outpaced the actual value of the end result. In an era of ever-tightening 
budgets and fiscal hawks seeking to cut costs, any budget item that shows increasing costs 
gets put in the crosshairs—sighted up for elimination. The spend data analysis supports the 
idea that software procurement costs are rising, and we anticipated interview responses to 
identify costs as a reason for establishing Kessel Run.  
Despite the costly and doomed-to-fail AOC 10.2 program giving Kessel Run the 
opportunity to exist, and the general increasing trend in costs for software development, 
our analysis discovered that cost metrics were not one of the primary focuses of the 
organization. Indeed, cost savings appear to be more of a welcome but unintended side 
effect of Kessel Run’s success. Based on our analysis of official communication, 
interviews with Kessel Run members, and external sources, Kessel Run was created to 
continuously deliver war-winning software for the warfighter at an unprecedented pace (A. 
Graham, personal communication, August 13, 2019). Delivering capable and responsive 
capabilities to their end user is the motivator for Kessel Run personnel. Kessel Run, it 
appears, was created to insource and develop capabilities. 
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 How Kessel Run Was Developed 
The second research question was, “How did the Air Force develop the Kessel Run 
organization?” Traditionally, military bureaucracy is slow to act and slow to change. In 
this organization, steeped in hierarchical structures and procedurally-based actions, new 
initiatives take time to develop. Federal policy appears to prioritize commercial activity 
contracting versus competing with the private sector as well as cost reduction versus core 
competency focus. However, Kessel Run sought to return the software development 
capacity back to the military. Seemingly somewhat out of line with federal policy, the 
organization prioritized competency development with no direct goal of reducing costs.  
Based on analysis of Kessel Run’s published literature, personnel interviews, and 
information from outside of the organization, Kessel Run circumvented the traditional 
bureaucracy by learning and imitating industry best practices. Founding members leaned 
heavily on startup literature such as The Lean Startup to establish the organization’s 
identity. Organizing and behaving like a startup company instead of a traditional military 
organization enables Kessel Run to attract top talent, swiftly respond to customer needs, 
and deliver capabilities at a rate unmatched in traditional government procurement.  
B. WHY IT MATTERS 
Why does Kessel Run matter? Because the end user and the Air Force mission 
matter. Kessel Run has adopted a proven civilian method to develop, administer, and 
maintain software in a very short amount of time and at a cost much lower than the 
traditional method of procurement.  
The most impactful aspect of Kessel Run’s success is the organization’s delivery, 
administration, and maintenance of effective software for the warfighter. The 
organization’s ability to overcoming the shortfall of the AOC 10.2 program through 
continuous capability development is the support the warfighter deserves. Kessel Run is 
built around the Air Force’s mission and their dedication to the warfighter. It is apparent 
that they pride themselves on their ability to rapidly deliver innovative state-of-the-art 
software in any domain at any time.  
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The second takeaway is that Kessel Run has shown that alternatives to the 
traditional procurement cycle can be effective and can work within the Air Force. Kessel 
Run was able to circumvent the typical military bureaucracy by adopting the practices and 
methods of new-age startup tech companies as well as large established tech companies, 
like Google. Removing or reducing red tape and embracing an agile, innovative structure 
can deliver positive products, reduce timelines, and save money. Kessel Run is proof that 
the standard operating mode of military software development can be deviated from and 
benefit end users and the Air Force as a whole. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Kessel Run Recommendations 
Kessel Run has proven that a nontraditional organization can benefit the Air Force. 
However, that does not mean that a Kessel Run-type organization is the right response to 
all procurement shortcomings. Based on our findings, however, the Air Force should 
explore areas where Quinn and Hilmer’s (1994) second question of the make-or-buy 
analysis—what vulnerabilities exist if the market fails outsourced needs—represents 
unacceptable risk to mission execution and determine if insourcing the capability is a viable 
alternative. Although a startup-structured organization may not be the best way to insource 
in all situations, asking the question of whether or not something should be insourced will 
force the Air Force to identify areas of risk to mitigate if necessary. 
 Further Research Recommendations 
Our review of federal policy revealed that policy prioritizes commercial 
contracting, except in specific circumstances, and prioritizes cost minimization. With that 
being said, Kessel Run appears to do the exact opposite; the organization has insourced 
previously outsourced capabilities and prioritized metrics that do not track cost. The 
benefits of focusing on developing software competency through insourcing has led to 
better, timely-delivered products. Further research should be done to review other federal 
government contracting efforts related to outsourcing capabilities to determine if the efforts 
are in line with federal policy or if they could benefit from deviating from policy as Kessel 
Run has done.  
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